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Efficiency Costs of Subsidy 
Rules for Crop Insurance 
H. Holly Wang, Steven D. Hanson, 
and J. Roy Black 
Participation in federal crop insurance programs has been encouraged through 
premium subsidies. The current subsidy depends on contract features as well as 
coverage levels. This type of  subsidy rule causes farmers to choose contract designs 
and coverages that are not efficient for managing risk, in order to capture subsidy. 
Farmers are found to be as  well off with a flat subsidy that is up to 25% less than the 
value of  the current regressive proportional subsidy. 
Key words: crop insurance, futures, risk management, subsidy 
Introduction 
Farmer, lender, and congressional interest in the use of alternative instruments to 
manage income risk has led to a proliferation of federally facilitated insurance products. 
The development of new insurance products is likely to continue because the  Agricultural 
Risk Protection Act (ARPA) of 2000 provides financial incentives for the development 
of new private-sector insurance products and increases insurance premium subsidies 
to encourage higher participation and coverage levels. 
Farmers now have a wide array of instruments for managing income risk. Futures, 
forward contracts, and other derivative pricing contracts allow flexible pricing strategies, 
while multiple-peril (MP) yield insurance, which triggers payoffs based on individual- 
farm yield shol-tfalls,  has long been an  option to manage yield risk. More recently, area- 
yield insurance, which triggers payoffs based on county-yield shortfalls, has been made 
available to many farmers. Revenue insurance is  the  latest  risk-management innovation 
available to farmers. By providing direct protection against revenue shortfalls, revenue 
insurance may be easier for farmers to use and may offer better risk protection than 
existing price and  yield management contracts. Revenue insurance, like yield insurance, 
can potentially feature a variety of designs including indemnification based on an  indi- 
vidual-farm index, an area index, or some alternative method to value shortfalls. 
In an effort to encourage participation in insurance programs, premiums charged to 
farmers using federally sponsored insurance products have historically included what 
was intended to be a "flat" per acre subsidy across insurance products and coverage levels. 
In practice, the subsidy differed across farmers in different risk classification categories. 
Recently, the subsidy structure has been modified to a regressive proportional subsidy 
H. Holly Wangis  assistant professor, DepartmentofAgridturalEconomics,  Washingtonstate University. Steven D. Hanson 
and J. Roy Black are professors, both in the Department ofAgricultura1 Economics, Michigan State University. The authors 
gratefully acknowledge the 6nancial support of the Washington and Michigan Agricultural Experiment Stations. 
Review coordinated by Gary D. Thompson. Wang, Hanson, and Black  Eficiency Costs of Subsidy Rules for  Crop Insurance  117 
where the subsidy is proportional to the premium charged to farmers but the rate of 
subsidy declines as  the  coverage level increases. The available subsidy levels are signifi- 
cantly higher under the new subsidy structure than in the past. 
Even in the absence of a subsidy, other factors such as imperfect risk classification 
and asymmetric information cause farmers to pay premiums that  differ from their actu- 
arially fair level. The relationship between the premium charged to the  farmer and the 
actuarially fair premium can be characterized as a "wedge," defined as  the ratio of the 
actual premium to the actuarially fair premium. While the premium wedge can be 
greater or less than one for any individual farmer, there is evidence showing most 
farmers face a subsidy-free wedge that is significantly greater than one (Just, Calvin, 
and Quiggin; Skees; Coble et al.). Both the premium wedge and the subsidy have the 
potential to alter farmer incentives to use insurance for managing risk. 
The primary objectives of this study are: (a)  to investigate the ability of alternative 
insurance contracts to manage risk, (b) to study the effect of the regressive proportional 
subsidy on contract choice, and (c) to measure the cost to the  farmer from bearing addi- 
tional risk which results from using the  portfolio chosen under the  regressive proportional 
subsidy as opposed to a flat subsidy. Performance is measured by a willingness-to-pay 
measure in an  expected utility framework for an individual corn farmer. The farmer is 
eligible for loan deficiency payments and is  allowed to use various portfolios of risk man- 
agement instruments including combinations of pre-harvest-pricing contracts and yield 
or revenue insurance. Insurance contracts are included in portfolios under a variety of 
design specifications to investigate the impact of each design feature on performance. 
Modeling is conducted under four cases: (a)  with and without a pre-subsidy premium 
wedge, (b)  with both a flat and regressive proportional subsidy, (c)  for high and low loan 
deficiency trigger rates, and (d)  with zero and negative price-yield correlation. Numer- 
ical simulation and optimization methods are used because of the  complex nature  of the 
decision problem. 
Previous Studies 
Programs currently administered by the  U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) 
Risk Management Agency (RMA) have provided crop insurance to farmers since 1938. 
The design of insurance contracts offered to farmers has evolved over time in an  effort 
to increase participation and address problems related to moral hazard, adverse selec- 
tion, and administrative costs (Skees; Skees and Barnett; Skees, Black, and Barnett). 
As a result, farmers currently have a wide variety of crop insurance contracts for use in 
conjunction with other pricing contracts to manage income risk. These insurance con- 
tracts permit insuring yields or revenues where indemnification is based on individual 
or area indices. In addition, for each insurance contract, the indemnity can effectively 
be priced using replacement price coverage, which is the greater of the realized harvest 
futures price and the pre-plant  harvest futures price. Most of  the available crop 
insurance contracts have been studied to some extent in previous work. 
Miranda explored insurance indemnification based on area-yield indices and found 
the lower transaction costs associated with area-yield insurance, in combination with 
potentially higher coverage levels, could allow better risk protection than individual- 
yield insurance for many farmers. In a study of the optimal design of area-yield insurance 
contracts, Mahul concluded optimal contract design depends on the sensitivity of farm 118  April 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
yield to area yield. The implications of combining insurance with other risk management 
contracts in a farmer's portfolio are not addressed in these studies. The simultaneous 
use of yield insurance and futures contracts is considered by Myers. While these studies 
provide helpful insights into the use of insurance contracts in a portfolio setting, they 
are limited by restrictive assumptions on price and yield distributions, farmer prefer- 
ences, and contract designs. 
The impacts of  alternative yield insurance designs on portfolio choice and welfare 
were investigated by Wang et al. for an individual corn farmer. Futures, options, and 
yield insurance were considered in various combinations in the farmer's risk man- 
agement portfolio. Their findings indicate area-yield insurance can perform nearly as 
well as, or better than, individual-yield insurance. The performance of individual-yield 
relative to area-yield insurance was found to be sensitive to the  premium wedge on indi- 
vidual-yield insurance as well as the incorporation of pricing contracts in the portfolio. 
Revenue insurance was not considered in the above studies. 
Incorporating recent developments in the  theory of insurance under incomplete mar- 
kets, Mahul and Wright evaluated the optimal design of revenue insurance. Based on 
their results, if the indemnity schedule depends only on individual yield and price, and 
the  revenue insurance contract is unrestricted and actuarially fair,  crop yield insurance 
and  price hedging instruments  are  redundant to the optimally designed revenue insurance 
contract. However, Mahul and Wright also found that if coverage levels are restricted 
or insurance instruments are not priced actuarially fair, then separate contracts for 
yield and price risk may play a key role even if some form of revenue insurance is avail- 
able. In practice, revenue coverage levels are restricted and the premiums charged to 
individual farmers are seldom actuarially fair-leaving  unanswered questions  regarding 
the role of revenue insurance as a risk management tool. 
A number of studies have begun to address the role of revenue insurance and its abil- 
ity to manage risk under imperfect market conditions. A stylized model was employed 
by Poitras to examine the simultaneous use of futures and revenue insurance. Heifner 
and Coble assessed the performance  of  alternative insurance contract  designs for 
representative farms. Individual insurance contracts, including a form of individual- 
revenue insurance, were evaluated in portfolios with and without replacement price 
coverage. Revenue insurance was found to outperform yield insurance when no pre- 
harvest pricing was used. However, when pre-harvest pricing is  included in the portfolio, 
yield insurance  becomes competitive with revenue insurance. Heifner and Coble's study 
assumes fwed coverage levels and that all farmers pay an actuarially fair premium and 
receive a flat subsidy; area insurance designs are not considered. 
In a recent study, Coble, Heifner, and Zuniga examined the optimal futures hedge 
and put hedge when individual-revenue and individual-yield insurance are available. 
Numerical methods were used to quantify price hedging ratios for different insurance 
contract designs and coverage levels. The results show a positive relationship between 
the price hedging ratios and the use of yield insurance. Further, replacement pricing 
was also found to be complementary to hedging, and individual revenue insurance 
emerged as a strong substitute for hedging, especially at  high coverage levels. 
Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes compared the efficiency of revenue insurance versus 
combinations of price and yield insurance. Their findings reveal revenue insurance is 
less costly than price and yield insurance. Similarly, area-index revenue insurance is 
found to be less costly than individual-index revenue insurance. The results also show Wang, Hanson, and Black  Efficiency Costs of Subsidy Rules for  Crop Insurance  1 19 
a revenue insurance can significantly reduce government outlays relative to the 1990 
farm program mix. Revenue insurance was found to increase the efficiency of  income 
redistribution because it only provides protection when needed. The role of  futures 
contracts and replacement pricing are not addressed in the analysis. 
Premium Wedges 
Each of  the foregoing studies on revenue insurance assumes the insurance premium is 
actuarially fair or that the farmer pays the fair premium and receives a flat  subsidy. In 
practice, the subsidy has  varied across farmers in different risk classification categories. 
Beginning in 2001  with ARPA, the subsidy is set proportional to the premium, and the 
subsidy proportion decreases as the coverage level increases. In addition, even in the 
absence of  a subsidy, farmers may face a premium that is not actuarially fair because 
of  factors such as  asymmetric information and imperfect risk classification. For example, 
RMA reinsurance policies require all farmers in a given location and risk class be charged 
the same premium, which may result in a difference between the premium paid by the 
farmer and the farmer's actuarially fair premium. RMA allows insurance providers to 
reclassify farmers for reinsurance purposes only, suggesting both RMA and the insur- 
ance providers recognize these pre-subsidy wedges exist and can vary significantly 
across farmers. 
The wedge faced by any farmer can be less than one, where the farmer's premium is 
below the actuarially fair premium, or greater than one, where the farmer's premium 
is above the actuarially fair premium.' For example, a farmer in a given risk class with 
relatively high (low)  risk might face a wedge that is less (greater)  than one. Just, Calvin, 
and Quiggin decompose farmer incentives to participate in crop insurance programs into 
risk, subsidy,  and asymmetric  information incentives. Using a national farm-level data- 
base for corn and soybeans, they found the asymmetric  information incentive is almost 
always negative, showing, in the absence of  subsidies, the majority of  farmers pay a 
premium well above their actuarially  fair level. Hypothesizing one reason for this finding, 
the authors note that yields used to calculate insurance premiums have been well below 
farmers' actual yields, resulting in an upward bias in farmers' insurance premiums. Fur- 
thermore,  without subsidies,  no farmers  would view crop yield insurance desirable  for risk 
management. In a recent investigation of  crop insurance reform, Skees reports, despite 
federal subsidies,  farmers using individual-insurance  products ofien pay premiums above 
the actuarially fair level because the current risk classification approach is imperfect. 
Farmers who pay a premium above their actuarially fair price will have less incentive 
to transfer risk through insurance. The regressive  proportional subsidy faced by farmers 
can increase incentives to use insurance but also increase the likelihood of  farmers 
choosing insurance strategies that are not the most efficient means of  managing risk.' 
For example, the regressive  feature of the current subsidy may affect the optimal cover- 
age level as  farmers attempt to capture subsidy income. In addition,  because the subsidy 
Risk-averse farmers might be willing to pay a premium above the actuarially fair level if the insurance instrument pro- 
vides sufficient risk protection. 
Efficient risk management refers to the portfolio of risk management instruments  which maximizes expected utility in 
the absence of any subsidy distortions.  When the efficient  risk management portfolio is altered in an effort to capture subsidy 
income, the portfolio under subsidy is termed a 'less efficientm  means of managing risk, because if the subsidy is removed, 
that portfolio would produce a lower level of expected utility than the efficient risk management portfolio. 120  April 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
level differs across insurance contracts, farmers may choose contracts that  provide 
higher levels of  subsidy income but offer less risk protection. 
This study extends previous work by further examining the  risk management ability 
of alternative insurance contracts and  the  effects of premium wedges. However, the 
primary focus of this analysis is to examine the impact of the regressive proportional 
subsidy on optimal insurance contract choice and risk management. 
The Model 
The decision problem is characterized by an  individual farmer who is assumed to choose 
a portfolio of risk management instruments prior to planting that maximizes expected 
utility of wealth at harvest. Choices are  modeled in a two-period context. Prior to plant- 
ing, the farmer forms an  estimate of the conditional joint distribution of harvest prices 
and  yields. Prices and  yields are  then realized at  harvest, and  profit is determined. Prior 
to planting, the farmer chooses the portfolio of risk management instruments, x, that 
maximize the expected utility of wealth: 
where u(.)  is an  increasing and concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, w 
is the initial wealth level per acre, n(.) is the profit per acre, and g(.  I Q)  is the joint 
density for harvest prices and yields conditional on 0,  the set of information available 
when the portfolio is selected prior to ~lanting.~  The random price vector p consists of 
cash and futures prices for corn at  harvest, as well as the prices used to indemnify the 
alternative  insurance instruments. The random yield vector y contains  the  farmer's 
individual yield at  harvest and  the yield indices used to indemnify the alternative 
insurance instruments. Constant relative  risk aversion is assumed where u(w + n)  = 
(1  - B)-'(w  + n)l-e, and the constant relative risk-aversion parameter is set at  8 = 2.4 
The profit function consists of up to five components: 
(2)  n(p, y, x) = NP + PHP  + YI  + RI  + LDP, 
where 
NP  = py - dy); 
PHP  = h(fo - f) - hg; 
YI  = ScPc  m=[o, xcE(yc)  -  Y,]  - Ac(xc)ac[s,,  x,, PC,  E(Y,)]  ; 
RI  = s, ~=[o,~,P,E(Y,)  -fyr] - A,(x,)a,[s,,x,,~,, ~(y,),f,]; and 
LDP = E(y)  max[0,  dE(p) - 
Profits and wealth are expressed on a per acre basis. The results can be extended to the whole farm  by multiplying by 
the number of acres. 
The relative risk-aversion parameter of 2.0 falls within the range estimated in studies by Antle; Arrow; Binswanger; 
Hamal and Anderson; and Myers. 
For any value z, the operator max10, z] chooses the maximum of zero or z. Wang,  Hanson, and Black  Eficienq Costs of Subsidy Rules for  Crop Insurance  12 1 
The profit function in (2) contains stylized versions of the major types of risk manage- 
ment instruments now available to U.S. farmers. The choice vector x = (h,  x,, x,, s,, s,) 
consists of  decisions surrounding the amount of  futures to trade and the amount of 
insurance to purchase. It is assumed decisions are made simultaneously in a portfolio 
setting given the known parameters and probability distributions. 
The NP component is  the  net  profit from producing and selling corn without using any 
risk management instruments. Therefore p is the local cash price at harvest, y is the 
farmer's yield at  harvest, and c(.) is production cost.6 The PHP component is the net 
return from pre-harvest pricing. Here, h is the amount of futures contracts sold (pur- 
chased if negative) prior to planting, fo is the initial futures price when h is selected, f 
is  the  futures  price at  harvest, andg  is the  transaction costs per unit offutures contracts 
bought or sold.' 
The YI  and RI components are net returns from using yield insurance and revenue 
insurance, respectively. When using individual-index insurance, the  farmer is  required 
to insure all planted acres; thus, the acreage scaling factors for both yield and revenue 
insurance (s, and s,, respectively) are restricted to equal one. If the farmer elects to use 
area insurance, the amount of insurance per acre can be adjusted by selecting acreage 
scaling factors that differ from one, allowing the farmer to effectively cross-hedge with 
area insurance. 
In  the  YI  component, the  temp,  is the  price used to indemnify the  yield shortfalls  for 
the chosen insurance contract;  y, is the yield index, which may or may not be the farmer's 
actual yield, used to determine yield shortfalls; E(y,) is the expected value at  planting 
of the yield index; x, is the proportion of expected yield index that will trigger indemni- 
fication; and a,(.)  is the actuarially fair yield insurance premium. The wedge (A,),  which 
may vary across coverage levels, is used to adjust the insurance premium if it differs 
from the actuarially fair premium because of a subsidy or other factors.' The price index 
(p,) could be set at  the initial futures price, the realized futures price, or some other 
notion of expected price. For contracts with replacement price coverage,p, = max( f,  f,). 
The random yield index  y, could reflect the  farmer's actual  yield level as  in the multiple- 
peril (MP) contract, or some area-yield index as  in the Group Risk Plan (GRP) contract. 
The RI  component is the net return from using revenue insurance. Here, p, is the 
price index used to determine the trigger revenueiy, is the yield index, E(y,) is the ex- 
pected value at  planting of the yield index, and  x, is the proportion of expected revenue 
that will trigger indemnification. Using the farmer's yield as  the  yield index results in 
individual-revenue insurance as  in the Income Protection (IP) contract, while using an 
area-yield index produces area-revenue insurance as  in the Group Risk Income Protection 
(GRIP) contract. Replacement price coverage sets  p, = max( f,  fo)  as in the yield insur- 
ance case. The actuarially fair revenue insurance premium is a,(-),  and the wedge A,, 
which may vary across coverage levels, is used to adjust the insurance premium if it 
differs from the actuarially fair premium because of a subsidy or other factors. 
The farmer's yield at harvest is exogenous in the sense that all production decisions  are assumed to be hed  at planting. 
'Commodity options were also included as a pre-harvest pricinginsbmment.  Consistent with Wang et al., and Heifner and 
Coble, adding option  sto  portfolios  containingfutures  and insurance sometimes result  sin  complexhedging positions,  but adds 
little value in terms of risk management. In the interest of space, we report only the results for pre-harvest pricing with 
futures. 
The premium charged to a farmer almost always differs from the actuarially fair premium because of asymmetric infor- 
mation, risk class pooling, or subsidies. In this study, we characterize these effects by making the appropriate proportional 
adjustment to the farmer's actuarially fair premium. 122  April 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Finally, the  LDP component is  the  return from the  loan deficiency payment. The term 
d designates the trigger price as a proportion of  expected cash price. It is assumed 
there is  no premium charged to the  farmer and no "set-asidenrequirement  to participate, 
so the  LDP is essentially a free put option on the cash price where the exercise price is 
dE(p). 
Model Parameterization 
As a starting  point, we use the  joint price-yield generating  process at  harvest conditional 
on information available at  planting, estimated by Wang et al., for an  individual farmer 
in southwest Iowa for the 1994-95 crop year. The model is  calibrated using a bivariate 
ARCH model with seasonality to estimate the price-generating process for harvest 
prices (Engle;  Fackler). Weekly cash prices for the  southwestern Crop Reporting District 
in  Iowa and  weekly Chicago Board of Trade futures settlement prices are  used to param- 
eterize the model. 
An inverse hyperbolic sine function is  then used to estimate the  yield-generating 
process at  the county level (Moss and Shonkwiler). Individual farm yield data were 
available for only 10  years, making it  difficult to estimate yield distributions for individ- 
ual farms with the desired level of precision. As a result, farm-level yield distributions 
are generated by employing the central tendency and variance from farm-level data to 
rescale the  county-level  yield distribution. Correlation between harvest prices and  yields 
is imposed according to the  normal transformation procedure proposed by Taylor. There 
is no closed-form solution for the conditional joint price-yield distribution at planting, 
and so a discrete estimate of the  joint distribution is  generated using stochastic simula- 
tion (Myers  and  Hanson). The frequency distribution of the  simulated  harvest prices and 
yields is  then used as  an  estimate  of the  joint distribution of prices and  yields at  harvest, 
conditional on information available at  planting. 
There is evidence suggesting the simulated harvest distribution is reflective of  a 
historically low price risk environment. The coefficient of variation for futures prices in 
the simulated distribution was about 15%, while Coble and Heifner found a typical 
range of  18% to 20% for the coefficient of variation of  futures prices for corn. In this 
study, the  joint price-yield distribution is  generated using the Wang et al. approach, but 
proportionally increasing the ARCH parameters by 140%, thereby shifting the scale of 
the distribution but retaining the original mean levels. This procedure produces a coef- 
ficient of variation for futures prices of around 20%. A corresponding joint distribution 
was simulated with zero price-yield correlation. Analyzing the performance of  alter- 
native insurance instruments based on each simulated distribution allows results to be 
generalized across different risk environments. Table 1  shows the  sample moments and 
correlations for the simulated distributions. 
The remaining parameters  were selected to be representative of farmers  in southwest 
Iowa during the mid-1990s. The initial wealth term, reflecting equity claims to such 
assets as land and machinery used in the farming operation, is set at $500 per acre 
(consistent with both Jolly and Olson). Production cost, adapted from Jolly and from 
Olson, is  specified as  $2.18(E [y I Q]  ) + $0.17y, where E [y I Q]  is  the  expected yield condi- 
tional on information at planting. The first term in the cost function reflects the costs 
of planting, applying fertilizer and chemicals, and  other incurred fixed costs in the 
production process. The second term reflects uncertain variable costs which depend on Wang, Hanson, and Black  Efficiency Costs of Subsidy Rules for  Crop Insurance  123 
Table 1. Sample Moments and Correlations for Simulated Distributions for 
a Corn Farmer in Southwest Iowa 
Sample Moments  Sample Correlation 
Standard  Futures  Cash  County  Farm 
Variable  Mean  Deviation  Skewness  Kurtosis  Price  Price  Yield  Yield 
<- -  -  -  --  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - NEGATIVE PRICE--  CO-mON  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  > 
Futures Price  $2.56  $0.49  0.41  3.10  1.00  0.85  -0.40  -0.33 
Cash Price  $2.48  $0.51  0.50  3.45  1.00  -0.46  -0.38 
County Yield  117.5  bdac  30.40 bdac  -1.20  4.07  1.00  0.83 
Farm  Yield  117.5 bdac  36.48 bdac  -0.97  3.28  1.00 
Revenue  $284.63  $92.94  -0.32  3.22 
<---------------------mROpRICE-YIELDCO-LAmON---------------------> 
Futures Price  $2.56  $0.49  0.41  3.10  1.00  0.85  0.00  0.05 
Cash Price  $2.48  $0.51  0.50  3.45  1.00  0.01  0.03 
County Yield  117.5 bdac  30.40 bdac  -  1.20  4.07  1.00  0.83 
Farm  Yield  117.5 bdac  36.48 bdac  -0.97  3.28  1.00 
Revenue  $292.43  $109.38  -0.15  2.84 
Notes: Sample correlations between prices and yields for the case of zero price-yield differ from zero as a result of sampling 
error. The data used to  generate the simulated distributions are described in Wang et al. 
realized harvest levels, such as combining costs, grain drying, and transportation costs 
from the field to the point of  sale. Futures prices are restricted to be unbiased in the 
sense that expected gains from trading are zero, so the futures price at planting is set 
equal to  expected future price  at harvest conditional on information available at 
planting. The transaction costs associated with using futures (brokerage costs, etc.) are 
set at  $0.015 per bushel. Finally, the trigger for the loan deficiency payment is set both 
at  the expected cash price (d = 1.0) and below the expected cash price (d = 0.75) in order 
to evaluate the effect of different levels of price support. 
In practice, coverage levels are  restricted by the Risk Management Agency. To reflect 
these restrictions, coverage for individual-index insurance is allowed to be no more than 
85%  of expected index value, and the number of acres for which insurance is purchased 
(scaled acres) is restricted to 100%  of planted acres, which approximates the levels used 
by RMA to reduce exposure to potential moral hazard problems. Coverage for area-index 
insurance in the restricted cases is set at  no more than 90% of the expected index value, 
which also reflects RMA policy. However, if the subsidy does not change as coverage 
increases beyond 90% of the expected index value, the area-insurance restriction could 
be set higher because area-based instruments eliminate moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems associated with individual-index insurance. For similar reasons, 
there is no need to restrict area insurance scaled acres under a flat subsidy. However, 
under the regressive subsidy, scaled acres for area insurance need to be restricted in 
order to avoid incentives to capture large amounts of subsidy. Under the regressive sub- 
sidy, area insurance is evaluated with scaled acres restricted to be no more than 150% 
of planted acres, reflecting current RMA policy. 
Actuarially fair insurance premiums are set equal to the expected insurance payout. 
However, imperfect risk classification, asymmetric information, and transaction costs 
typically cause farmers using individual-index insurance to pay premiums that differ 
from actuarially fair levels. Black and Hu estimated the  wedge for the median Iowa corn 
farmer purchasing crop insurance during a 10-year  period from 1985 to 1995  to be about 124  April 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 2. Regressive Proportional Subsidy Rates 
Subsidy Amount in Proportion 
to Actuarially Fair Premium 
Coverage Level in Proportion  Individual  Area 
to Expected Index Value  Insurance  Insurance 
Source: Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000. 
1.3. To gain insights into the impacts of the premium wedge faced by farmers, individual- 
index products are analyzed at  two possible pre-subsidy premium levels: (a)  an  actuari- 
ally fair premium, and (b)  a premium 30% above the actuarially fair level. 
We did also examine a number of  other wedge levels. The insurance value to the 
farmer naturally increases for pre-subsidy premiums below the actuarially fair level 
because of the  income effect. However, the insurance and futures positions chosen by the 
farmer are very similar to the case of an  actuarially fair pre-subsidy premium because 
the  farmer is at, or near, the maximum insurance coverage levels in both cases. For other 
wedges where the premium is above the actuarially fair pre-subsidy premium, both the 
insurance and futures positions and the insurance value to the farmer change, but the 
basic results remain the same, in a relative sense, as  for the 1.3 pre-subsidy premium 
wedge case reported by Black and Hu. 
Area-index insurance is characterized by low transaction costs, and all farmers face 
the same area-index distribution. Therefore, if adequate data are available to estimate 
the area-index distribution, pre-subsidy premiums should always be near actuarially 
fair. Consequently,  we consider only the  case of an  actuarially fair pre-subsidy premium 
when the farmer uses area-index insurance products. 
The flat subsidy to the farmer is set at  55% of the actuarially fair premium for a 50% 
coverage individual-yield insurance contract, which is consistent with previous RMA 
policy. The subsidy is the same for all insurance products. Under current RMA policy, 
the subsidy, as a proportion of  the insurance premium, differs by coverage level and 
contract type (individual versus area), as shown in table 2. A polynomial function is fit 
to each subsidy schedule and then used to represent the subsidy function available to 
the farmer when adopting individual or area insurance. 
Numerical Results 
To evaluate the performance of the alternative contract designs and portfolios of risk 
management instruments, the decision problem in (1) is solved, subject to constraints 
on coverage and acreage scaling, using the  numerical secant method of Broyden, Fletcher, Wang, Hanson, and Black  Eflciency Costs of Subsidy Rules for Crop Insurance  125 
Goldfarb, and Shanno  in  the OPTMUM module of GAUSS (Aptech Systems, I~C.).~ 
We evaluate the performance of six portfolios, each including a loan deficiency program: 
(a)  individual-yield  insurance with futures, (b)  area-yield insurance with futures, (c)  indi- 
vidual-revenue insurance, (d)  area-revenue insurance, (e)  individual-revenue insurance 
with futures, and (f)  area-revenue insurance with futures. 
The performance of the alternative risk management portfolios is evaluated using a 
uwillingness-to-pay"  measure, defined as  how much certain income must be added to the 
farmer's income stream  in  a portfolio with no risk management instruments  to generate 
the same level of  expected utility achieved with optimal use of  the risk management 
instruments available in the portfolio. The focus of the discussion is  on the relative risk 
management performance of the different insurance contracts under the current regres- 
sive proportional subsidy as opposed to a flat subsidy. For completeness, the optimal 
futures, insurance coverage, and insured acreage hedge ratios are also shown for each 
portfolio. 
Tables 3 and 4 respectively show the optimal hedge ratios and willingness-to-pay 
values for the flat subsidy without and with replacement pricing for the six alternative 
risk management portfolios under various conditions the farmer might face. Likewise, 
tables 5 and 6 respectively show the optimal hedge ratios and willingness-to-pay values 
for a regressive proportional subsidywithout and with replacement pricing for the same 
risk management portfolios and conditions. These results provide important insights 
into performance of different portfolios, subsidy structures, and contract designs. 
Insurance Contract Choice Under a Flat Subsidy 
We start  by examining the results for a flat subsidy where the farmer receives the same 
subsidy across policies and coverage levels. The flat subsidy transferred to the farmer 
was $2.78 per acre regardless of  the type of  insurance contract used. Because the flat 
subsidy is the same for all contracts, it simply provides a wealth effect to the farmer. 
The flat subsidy causes almost no change in  the optimal hedge ratios or the  relative per- 
formance of the insurance instruments when compared to the case where no subsidy is 
received.''  Therefore, examining performance under the flat subsidy permits important 
insights into the risk management ability of different contract designs. 
Insurance Under a Flat Subsidy Without Replacement Pricing 
The ability of revenue insurance to substitute  for futures and yield insurance when 
insurance contracts are designed without replacement pricing is  first  examined.  An 
obvious result from table 3 is that the risk environment faced by the farmer affects the 
performance of  each portfolio. Negative price-yield correlation decreases the value of 
each portfolio because the "natural hedge" associated with the tendency of  price and 
yield to move in  opposite directions causes some stabilization in income and reduces the 
incentive to eliminate price and yield risks. The impact of the risk environment on the 
Because the utility function is strictly concave, the second-order conditions are satisfied. 
lo Because the flat subsidy has only a wealth effect, we do not report the results for the zem subsidy case in interest of 
space. At the level of precision reported in the tables, the only difference between the results is that the WTP  for the flat 
subsidy portfolios is between $2.68 and $2.76 higher than for the portfolios with no subsidy. 126  April2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 3. Hedge Ratios and Willingness to Pay with Flat Subsidy and Without Replace- 
ment Price Coverage 
Unrestricted Coverage  Restricted Coverage 
Scaled  Scaled 
Description  Futures  Coverage  Acres  WTP  Futures  Coverage  Acres  WTP 
<  -  - -  -  -  -  -  - 
ACTUARIALLY FAIR 
LDP  Trigger = 0.75: 
r IY with Futures 
r IR 
r IR  with Futures 
AY  with Futures  0.71 
+AR  - 
AR  with Futures  0.00 
LDP  Trigger = 1.0: 
r IYwithFutures 
.IR 
r IR with Futures 
AY with Futures  0.39 
WAR  - 
r AR with Futures  0.19 
ACTUARIALLY UNFAIR 
LDP  Trigger = 0.75: 
r N  with Futures 
IR 
IR  with Futures 
LDP  Trigger = 1.0: 
IY with Futures 
.rR 
IR with Futures 
. - -  -  -  - -  -  - - ZERO PRICE-YIELD CORRELATION -  -  -  - 
0.62  0.85 
-  0.85 
0.39  0.85 
max  0.92  $19.34  0.70  0.90 
max  0.89  $20.79  -  0.90 
max  0.89  $20.79  0.34  0.90 
0.30  0.85 
-  0.85 
0.06  0.85 
max  1.00  $40.42  0.41  0.90 
max  0.84  $40.36  -  0.90 
max  0.90  $40.50  0.00  0.90 
<- --  -  --  -  --  - --  -  - NEGATIVE PRICE-YIELD CORRELATION - -  - -  -  ----  -  -  ---> 
ACTUARIALLY FAIR 
LDP  Trigger = 0.75: 
N  with Futures  0.33  0.85  1.00  $15.93 
IR  -  0.85  1.00  $15.85 
IR  with Futures  0.11  0.85  1.00  $15.92 
AY with Futures  0.47  max  0.84  $13.52  0.31  0.90  1.15  $11.81 
*AR  -  1.61  0.79  $14.52  -  0.90  1.17  $11.98 
AR  with Futures  -0.03  1.61  0.79  $14.53  0.02  0.90  1.17  $12.01 
LDP  Trigger  = 1.0: 
IY  with Futures  0.00  0.85  1.00  $39.57 
b IR  -  0.85  1.00  $39.37 
IR  with Futures  0.00  0.85  1.00  $39.37 
AY  with Futures  0.15  max  0.93  $38.16  0.00  0.90  1.24  $35.45 
*AR  -  1.58  0.77  $36.46  -  0.90  1.28  $35.22 
AR  with Futures  -0.40  1.76  0.85  $37.35  0.06  0.90  1.28  $35.24 
ACTUARIALLY UNFAIR 
LDP  Trigger = 0.75: 
r IY with Futures  0.24  0.72  1.00  $9.86 
IR  -  0.72  1.00  $9.85 
IR  with Futures  0.08  0.72  1.00  $9.91 
LDP  Trigger = 1.0: 
IY with Futures  0.00  0.77  1.00  $33.23 
b IR  -  0.76  1.00  $33.10 
IR with Futures  0.00  0.76  1.00  $33.10 
Notes: Abbreviations and acronyms are defined as follows: WTP  =willingness to pay, N = individual-yield insurance,  IR = individual-revenue 
insurance,  AY =  area-yield  insurance,AR = area-revenueinsurance,  LDP=  loan deficiency  payment, andmax =maximum  possible coverage (zero 
deductible).  Themaximum  index value as  a proportion ofthe expected index value for the zero (negative)  price-yieldcorrelation case is 1.43 (1.43) 
for N insurance, 1.34 (1.34) for AY insurance, 1.97 (1.90) for IR insurance, and 1.87 (1.79)  for AR  insurance.  Actuarially fair and unfair refer 
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performance of  each portfolio also depends on coverage restrictions, insured acreage 
restrictions, and the size of any premium wedge faced by the  farmer. Restricting insurance 
coverage levels or increasing the premium wedge reduces the value of each portfolio. 
If the value of  a portfolio of  individual-yield insurance and futures is compared to 
individual-revenue insurance, a combination of yield insurance and futures always out- 
performs revenue insurance by itselfunder contract restrictions. When revenue insurance 
coverage is restricted, the farmer faces unprotected price and  yield risk even when taking 
the maximum allowed coverage. In contrast to direct individual-revenue insurance, the 
use of futures-which  are not restricted in terms of hedging position or trigger pricein 
portfolios with individual-yield insurance allows the farmer to adjust the amount of price 
protection to better manage risk. The results are mixed for area insurance, with direct 
area-revenue insurance sometimes outperforming  area-yield insurance and futures. If the 
farmer uses both revenue insurance and futures in a portfolio, the performance improves 
compared to revenue insurance by itself. However, individual-yield  insurance and futures 
can still outperform individual-revenue insurance and futures. 
Under current contract restrictions, the preferred indemnification index (individual 
versus area)  depends on the premium wedge faced by the farmer when using individual 
insurance. When the coverage restrictions are in place, portfolios with area insurance 
outperform portfolios with individual insurance when the  farmer faces  the 1.3 pre-subsidy 
premium wedge (30% above the actuarially fair level) on individual insurance. Here the 
less restrictive, lower-cost, area design more than offsets the associated index basis risk. 
However, when the  farmer faces the 1.0 pre-subsidy actuarially fair  wedge, portfolios with 
individual insurance outperform portfolios with area insurance. The benefits of the area 
design are not enough to offset the additional basis risk. These results are consistent for 
both revenue and yield insurance under current coverage restrictions. 
As discussed previously, the use of  area insurance eliminates the majority of moral 
hazard, adverse selection, and transaction costs problems that  hinder individual insur- 
ance. Because of its advantages, area insurance can potentially be offered to farmers 
under a flat subsidy with fewer restrictions and at  a relatively lower cost than individual 
insurance. If the  "ad hocn  area coverage restriction is removed, the additional flexibility 
improves the performance of portfolios with area insurance. Nevertheless, portfolios of 
individual insurance and futures may still outperform unrestricted area insurance and 
futures. 
The results show, with a flat (or zero) subsidy and without replacement pricing, the 
preferred portfolio under current coverage  restrictions is individual-yield insurance and 
futures whenever the farmer pays an actuarially fair pre-subsidy premium. When the 
farmer faces the 1.3  pre-subsidy  wedge, portfolios containing area  insurance are  preferred. 
Relaxing the area-insurance coverage restrictions improves the performance of area in- 
surance enough that it  is sometimes preferred to pre-subsidy actuarially fair individual 
insurance. However, without replacement pricing, revenue insurance is unable to com- 
pletely substitute for yield insurance in many cases. 
Insurance Under a Flat Subsidy with Replacement Pricing 
The use of replacement price coverage can significantly change the  way each insurance 
instrument performs in a given portfolio, as seen in table 4. When the farmer faces an 
actuarially fair pre-subsidy premium, replacement price coverage increases the value 
of portfolios containing individual insurance, especially individual-revenue insurance. 128  April2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 4. Hedge Ratios and Willingness to Pay with Flat Subsidy and with Replacement 
Price Coverage 
Unrestricted Coverage  Restricted Coverage 
Scaled  Scaled 
Description  Futures  Coverage  Acres  WTP  Futures  Coverage  Acres  WTP 
ACTUARIALLY  FAIR 
LDP  Trigger = 0.75: 
N with Futures 
v IR 
IR with Futures 
AY  with Futures 
WAR 
AR with Futures 
LDP  Trigger = 1.0: 
N with Futures 
v IR 
IR with Futures 
AY  with Futures 
WAR 
AR with Futures 
ACTUARIALLY  UNFAIR 
LDP  Trigger = 0.75: 
b N with Futures 
b IR 
IR with Futures 
LDP  Trigger = 1.0: 
N  with Futures 
wIR 
IR with Futures 
<- - -  - - -  - - -  - - -  - - NEGATIVE PmCE-YIELD CQRmLATION -  - - -  -  - - - - -  -  - - -  > 
ACTUARIALLY  FAIR 
LDP  Trigger = 0.75: 
N with Futures  0.45  0.85  1.00  $16.24 
wIR  -  0.85  1.00  $16.09 
IR with Futures  0.34  0.85  1.00  $16.77 
AY  with Futures  0.60  1.24  0.74  $13.49  0.35  0.90  0.96  $11.65 
*AR  -  1.19  0.73  $13.37  -  0.90  0.90  $11.80 
AR  with Futures  0.22  1.20  0.74  $13.64  0.22  0.90  0.95  $12.12 
LDP  Trigger = 1.0: 
+ N with Futures  0.07  0.85  1.00  $39.69 
+ IR  -  0.85  1.00  $40.34 
+ IR with Futures  0.00  0.85  1.00  $40.34 
+ AY  with Futures  0.28  1.28  0.80  $37.57  0.00  0.90  1.01  $35.02 
WAR  -  1.20  0.80  $36.99  -  0.90  1.03  $35.51 
AR with Futures  0.00  1.20  0.80  $36.99  0.00  0.90  1.03  $35.51 
ACTUARIALLY  UNFAIR 
LDP  Trigger = 0.75: 
N with Futures  0.30  0.68  1.00  $9.72 
r IR  -  0.63  1.00  $9.48 
r IR with Futures  0.23  0.65  1.00  $9.80 
LDP  Trigger = 1.0: 
N with Futures  0.00  0.71  1.00  $32.85 
r IR  -  0.69  1.00  $32.92 
IR with Futures  0.00  0.69  1.00  $32.92 
Notes: Abbreviations and acronyms are dehed  as follows: WTP = willingness to pay, N = individual-yield  insurance, IR = 
individual-revenue  insurance, AY  =  area-yield  insurance, AR =  area-revenue insurance, and LDP = loan deficiency  payment. 
Actuarially fair and unfair refer to the pre-subsidy premium levels. Wang, Hanson, and Black  Ejfiency Costs of Subsidy Rules for Crop Insurance  129 
Replacement pricing helps reduce unprotected income risk resulting from coverage 
restrictions. However, replacement pricing can significantly reduce the value of  port- 
folios containing area insurance. This is because, in the absence of coverage restrictions 
and replacement pricing, the farmer is able to choose high area coverage in an effort to 
reduce income risk. At high coverage levels, replacement pricing can add up-side price 
risk that increases income risk and consequently decreases the value of the portfolio. 
The result also holds when coverage is restricted, because the farmer is able to maintain 
?high coverage" by increasing scaled acreage  to substitute for restricted coverage. Nega- 
tive price-yield correlation and high LDP trigger prices can reduce or eliminate  the effect. 
In contrast, portfolios with restricted area-revenue  insurance and futures show gains from 
using replacement pricing because the combination of replacement  pricing and futures can 
be used to reduce unwanted income risk resulting from the coverage restriction. 
Using replacement pricing when the farmer faces the 1.3 pre-subsidy wedge causes 
alarger income decline  because replacement pricing increases the size of the actuarially 
fair pre-subsidy premium from which the proportional  wedge is calculated. Replacement 
pricing will only have value if it can decrease income risk enough to offset the cost asso- 
ciated with the additional decline in expected income. Portfolios of  individual-revenue 
insurance by itself are always hurt by replacement pricing, but portfolios containing 
insurance and futures can sometimes benefit from replacement pricing even with the 
1.3 pre-subsidy wedge. 
Under current restrictions, the combination of individual-revenue  insurance and 
futures is now the farmer's preferred portfolio when the pre-subsidy premium is actu- 
arially fair. When the farmer faces the 1.3 pre-subsidy wedge, area-revenue contracts 
are included in the preferred portfolio. These portfolios are also preferred to the portfolios 
without replacement pricing-indicating,  under a flat subsidy and current restrictions, a 
form of revenue insurance with replacement pricing is the preferred contract design. 
If the coverage restrictions are lifted, the value of area insurance again increases. With 
the actuarially fair pre-subsidy premium, the farmer still prefers individual-revenue 
insurance and futures. However, in the presence of the 1.3 pre-subsidy wedge, the farmer 
sometimes prefers area-yield  insurance  with futures.  As expected, the farmer often prefers 
unrestricted area-insurance  contracts without replacement pricingto avoid the associated 
up-side price risk that occurs with high coverage levels and replacement pricing. 
With a flat (or zero) subsidy and with replacement pricing, the results show the pre- 
ferred portfolio under current coverage restrictions  is individual-revenue  insurance with 
futures whenever the farmer pays an actuarially fair pre-subsidy premium. This is in 
contrast to the case without replacement pricing, where individual-yield insurance  with 
futures was preferred. Once again, when the farmer faces the 1.3 pre-subsidy  wedge, area 
insurance contracts are preferred. However, when the area-insurance coverage restric- 
tions are relaxed, the farmer often prefers contracts without replacement pricing. 
Insurance Contract Choice Under a Regressive 
Proportional Subsidy 
The subsidy level for each optimal portfolio in tables 5 and 6 shows the farmer clearly 
prefers the current subsidy to the former flat subsidy ($2.78) because of  the greater 
income transfer. Moreover, because the current subsidy received by the farmer differs 
across contracts, the farmer now faces an income incentive (from the subsidy) in addi- 
tion to a risk management incentive  when selecting  a contract. As shown in table 2, area 130  April 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 5. Hedge Ratios and Willingness to Pay with Regressive Subsidy and Without 
Replacement Price Coverage 
Unrestricted Coverage  Restricted Coverage 
Cover-  Scaled  Cover-  Scaled 
Description  Futures  age  Acres  Subsidy  WTP  Futures  age  Acres  Subsidy  WTP 
<----- 
ACTUARIALLY FAIR 
LDP  Trigger  = 0.75: 
b IY  with Futures 
b IR 
IR with Futures 
b AY with Futures  0.73 
WAR  - 
b AR with Futures  0.00 
LDP  Trigger  = 1.0: 
b IY  with Futures 
bIR 
IR with Futures 
b AY with Futures  0.40 
WAR  - 
AR  with Futures  0.00 
ACTUARIALLY UNFAIR 
LDP  Trigger  = 0.75: 
IY  with Futures  .  IR 
b IR with Futures 
LDP  Trigger  = 1.0: 
b IY  with Futures 
.IR 
IR with Futures 
------------- ZERO PRICE-YIELD  CORRELATION -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
<------ 
ACTUARIALLY FAIR 
LDP  Trigger  = 0.75: 
IY  with Futures 
.IR 
b IR with Futures 
AY with Futures  0.50 
WAR  - 
AR with Futures  0.00 
LDP  Trigger  = 1.0: 
IY  with Futures 
b IR 
IR with Futures 
b AY with Futures  0.19 
.AR  - 
AR  with Futures  0.09 
ACTUARIALLY UNFAIR 
LDP  Trigger  = 0.75: 
IY  with Futures 
b IR 
IR with Futures 
LDP  Trigger  = 1.0: 
IY  with Futures 
b IR 
IR  with Futures 
----------  NEGATIVE  PRICE-YIELD  CORRELATION -  -  -  - 
Notes: Abbreviations and acronyms are defined as follows: WTP =willingness to pay, IY  = individual-yield  insurance, IR = 
individual-revenue  insurance, AY = area-yield  insurance, AR = area-revenue insurance, and LDP =  loan deficiency  payment. 
Actuarially fair and unfair refer to the pre-subsidy premium levels. Wang, Hanson, and Black  Ejficiency Costs of Subsidy Rules for Crop Insurance  13 1 
Table 6. Hedge Ratios and Willingness to Pay with Regressive Subsidy and with 
Replacement Price Coverage 
Unrestricted Coverage  Restricted Coverage 
Cover-  Scaled  Cover-  Scaled 
Description  Futures  age  Acres  Subsidy  WTP  Futures  age  Acres  Subsidy  WTP 
<  - -  -  - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - -  -  -  -  - ZERO PRICE-YIELD  CORRELATION -  -  -  - -  - -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  -  -  > 
ACTUTARIALLY FAIR 
LBP  Trigger  = 0.75: 
IY  with Futures  0.67  0.84  1.0  $9.36  $25.83 
+ IR  -  0.84  1.0  $11.53  $26.81 
IR with Futures  0.54  0.84  1.0  $11.58  $28.39 
AY  with Futures  0.80  1.01  1.5  $19.90  $31.54  0.78  0.90  1.5  $19.90  $31.18 
bAR  -  1.05  1.5  $24.72  $36.87  -  0.90  1.5  $24.72  $36.23 
AR with Futures  0.45  0.96  1.5  $24.72  $37.63  0.50  0.90  1.5  $24.72  $37.56 
LBP  Trigger  = 1.0: 
IY  with Futures  0.34  0.85  1.0  $9.28  $46.67 
b IR  -  0.84  1.0  $11.51  $49.09 
IR with Futures  0.20  0.84  1.0  $11.53  $49.30 
AY  with Futures  0.49  1.03  1.5  $19.90  $52.71  0.47  0.90  1.5  $19.90  $51.91 
*AR  -  0.99  1.5  $24.72  $58.58  -  0.90  1.5  $24.72  $58.32 
AR  with Futures  0.09  0.98  1.5  $24.72  $58.61  0.17  0.90  1.5  $24.72  $58.47 
ACWAR.IALLY UNFAIR 
LBP  Trigger  = 0.75: 
N with Futures  0.66  0.80  1.0  $9.62  $22.39 
IR  -  0.80  1.0  $11.74  $22.66 
IR  with Futures  0.55  0.79  1.0  $11.73  $24.34 
LBP  Trigger  = 1.0: 
IY  with Futures  0.34  0.80  1.0  $9.64  $43.11 
IR  -  0.80  1.0  $11.74  $44.89 
IR with Futures  0.22  0.80  1.0  $11.74  $45.16 
<- -  -  -  -  - -  -  - - - -  -  - - - NEGATIVE PRICE-yJELD CORRELATION -  -  - -  -  - - -  -  -  -  - -  -  -  -> 
ACWAIUALLY FAIR 
LBP  Trigger  = 0.75: 
IY  with Futures  0.43  0.82  1.0  $10.33  $23.32 
IR  -  0.83  1.0  $11.91  $24.75 
IR with Futures  0.33  0.83  1.0  $11.89  $25.38 
AYwithFutures  0.50  0.90  1.5  $18.55  $27.21  0.50  0.90  1.5  $18.55  $27.21 
*AR  -  0.90  1.5  $24.07  $31.01  -  0.90  1.5  $24.07  $31.01 
AR  with Futures  0.32  0.90  1.5  $24.07  $31.58  0.31  0.90  1.5  $24.07  $31.58 
LBP  Trigger  = 1.0: 
IY  with Futures  0.00  0.83  1.0  $10.28  $46.74 
IR  -  0.83  1.0  $11.85  $48.93 
IR with Futures  0.00  0.83  1.0  $11.85  $48.93 
AY  with Futures  0.26  0.99  1.5  $18.55  $51.13  0.13  0.90  1.5  $18.55  $50.92 
*AR  -  0.90  1.5  $24.07  $55.47  -  0.90  1.5  $24.07  $55.47 
AR  with Futures  0.00  0.90  1.5  $24.07  $55.47  0.00  0.90  1.5  $24.07  $55.47 
ACTUARIALLY UNFAIR 
LDP  Trigger  = 0.75: 
IY  with Futures  0.40  0.79  1.0  $10.44  $19.81 
IR  -  0.78  1.0  $11.87  $20.82 
IR with Futures  0.37  0.79  1.0  $11.90  $21.39 
LBP  Trigger  1  1.0: 
N with Futures  0.02  0.79  1.0  $10.46  $43.16 
IR  -  0.79  1.0  $11.93  $44.83 
IR with Futures  0.00  0.79  1.0  $11.93  $44.83 
Notes: Abbreviations and acronyms are defined as  follows: WTP  =willingness to pay, IY  = individual-yield  insurance, IR = 
individual-revenue insurance, AY = area-yield  insurance, AR  = area-revenue insurance, and LDP  =  loan deficiency  payment. 
Actuarially fair and unfair refer to the pre-subsidy premium levels. 132  April2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
insurance contracts are now subsidized at  higher coverage levels, and the rate  of subsidy 
is also higher than for individual contracts.  Further,  because the subsidy  is proportional 
to the pre-subsidy premium, revenue contracts receive higher subsidy than yield insur- 
ance unless the level of  price-yield correlation is extremely high. 
Under the risk environments faced by the farmer, the subsidy levels provided across 
contract types differ significantly." For example, at  current coverage constraints with 
no price-yield correlation, no replacement pricing, and an actuarially fair pre-subsidy 
premium, the farmer subsidy per acre is $20.80 for area-revenue, $17.13 for area-yield 
with futures, $9.92 for individual-revenue,  and $8.74 for individual-yield  insurance with 
futures. In the cases considered here, the regressive proportional subsidy increases the 
incentive to use area insurance contracts, particularly area-revenue contracts, in an 
effort to capture the larger subsidy even when these contracts may not be the most effi- 
cient in terms of managing risk. 
The current subsidy becomes even larger under replacement pricing, and therefore 
increases the incentive to adopt contracts with replacement pricing. Under the flat sub- 
sidy, adding replacement pricing to a contract often causes a decrease in the value of 
area insurance because of an increase in up-side price risk. However, under the regressive 
subsidy, the larger premium resulting from inclusion of replacement pricing in a contract 
provides enough additional subsidy income so that replacement pricing is preferred by 
the farmer in all contracts. 
The current subsidy  for individual insurance contracts when the farmer faces the 1.3 
pre-subsidy wedge is higher than for an actuarially fair pre-subsidy premium because 
of  both the regressive and proportional features of  the subsidy. However, the increase 
in income under the current subsidy is still not enough to offset the 1.3 pre-subsidy 
wedge effect. Consequently, area contracts are still preferred under the regressive pro- 
portional subsidy. 
The regressive proportional subsidy can also produce incentives for the farmer to 
choose coverage and acreage scaling which may increase or decrease income risk. Because 
the subsidy, as a percentage of the pre-subsidy premium, declines as the coverage 
increases, the farmer may choose a coverage level different from the level that  would be 
chosen for purely risk management purposes. For example, under the current subsidy, 
the farmer maximizes expected subsidy income from the individual insurance contracts 
by choosing just over an 80% coverage level. Here, the "coverage effect" of the subsidy 
is observed for the individual insurance contracts in optimal coverage levels falling 
below the 85%  coverage restriction which is chosen under the flat subsidy (to minimize 
risk) when the pre-subsidy contracts are priced actuarially fair. On the other hand, when 
the pre-subsidy  wedge is 1.3, the coverage effect reverses, causing  the farmer to increase 
coverage compared to the levels chosen under the flat subsidy in an effort to capture 
additional subsidy. If the pre-subsidy wedge is large enough, the regressive proportional 
subsidy can have the effect of moving the farmer toward a more efficient coverage level 
in terms of risk protection. 
The farmer can also increase the amount of subsidy received at  a given coverage level 
by increasing the scaled acres covered by insurance,  resulting in a subsidy "scaling effect." 
This strategy has no effect on individual insurance where current policies essentially 
l1 The relative subsidy levels for each type of insurance product may differ if a farmer faces risk situations differing from 
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set scaling at  100% of planted acres. However, current  policies allow a farmer using area 
insurance to insure up to 150% of planted acres. The results show the farmer always 
chooses to scale acres at  the 150% level under the regressive proportional subsidy. In 
contrast, the optimal area insurance acreage scaling under the flat subsidy is always 
below 150% of planted acres. 
When the subsidy scaling and coverage effects are combined in area insurance con- 
tracts, hedge ratios can differ significantly  from those chosen purely for risk management 
purposes. For example,  with no coverage  restrictions, the  farmer chooses area  insurance 
acreage scaling at 150% and coverage levels at, or slightly above, the 90% restriction. 
In contrast, under the flat subsidy, the farmer chooses area insurance acreage scaling 
below 100% and coverage levels at, or near, the maximum index value. 
For the risk setting evaluated in this study, the results show the current regressive 
proportional subsidy structure favors contracts featuring area indices based on revenue 
with replacement pricing as  well as  contracts having 1.3 pre-subsidy wedges. In addition, 
the regressive proportional subsidy can impact the optimal scaling and coverage levels 
as the farmer attempts to capture subsidy income. As a result, the current subsidy can 
affect the risk management benefits farmers receive from using crop insurance. 
Risk Management Costs Under the Regressive 
Proportional Subsidy 
The results reported in tables 3-6  have demonstrated the regressive proportional subsidy 
structure can alter the  optimal insurance contract choice from the optimal choice based 
on a risk management perspective. Table 7  shows the optimal contract designs under 
both the flat and regressive proportional subsidy for different cases the farmer might 
encounter, and table 8  presents the risk management costs of  the regressive propor- 
tional subsidy. Risk management cost is measured as the difference in willingness to 
pay for the optimal portfolio chosen under the flat subsidy and the optimal portfolio 
chosen under the regressive proportional subsidy when the farmer uses each portfolio 
and only receives the  flat subsidy. Comparing the  difference in willingness to pay for the 
two portfolios when the  farmer receives only the flat subsidy provides a measure of the 
cost to the farmer from bearing additional risk that results from using the portfolio 
chosen under the regressive proportional subsidy. 
When the farmer faces the actuarially fair pre-subsidy premium and area insurance 
is restricted, individual-revenue insurance with replacement pricing is the  optimal con- 
tract under the flat subsidy. However, the larger subsidy for area contracts causes the 
farmer to prefer area-revenue insurance with replacement pricing under the regressive 
proportional subsidy. In this case, the farmer switches from the individual-revenue 
insurance with replacement pricing, which is best at managing risk, to area-revenue 
insurance with replacement pricing to capture the additional subsidy. The cost in terms 
of less efficient risk protection from the switch ranges from $3.95  per acre to $6.18  per 
acre (table 8).  When the area restrictions are removed, the farmer prefers either area- 
revenue with replacement pricing or individual-revenue without replacement pricing 
under the flat subsidy. However, the larger subsidy incentive again causes the farmer 
to always prefer area-revenue insurance with replacement pricing under the regressive 
proportional subsidy. The cost to the farmer from using the area-revenue contract with 
replacement pricing ranges between $3.87  per acre and $6.18  per acre. 134  April 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 7. Optimal Contract Choice Under the Flat Subsidy and the Regressive 
Subsidy 
Actuarially Fair  Actuarially Unfair 
Restricted  Unrestricted  Restricted  Unrestricted 
Description  Area Coverage  Area Coverage  Area Coverage  Area Coverage 
<-------------------  msmsmy  -------------------> 
Zero Price-Yield Correlation: 
LDP Trigger = 0.75  IR,  Rp  AR  AR, Rp  AR 
LDP Trigger = 1.0  IR,  Rp  IR,  RP  AR, RP  AR 
Negative Price-Yield Correlation: 
LDP Trigger = 0.75  IR,  Rp  IR,  RP  AR, RP  AR 
LDP Trigger = 1.0  IR,  Rp  IR,  RP  AR, RP  AY 
<----------------  mGmssmsmsmy ----------------> 
Zero Price-Yield Correlation: 
LDP Trigger = 0.75  AR, Rp  AR, RP  AR, RP  AR, RP 
LDP Trigger = 1.0  AR, Rp  AR,  RP  AR, RP  AR, RP 
Negative Price-Yield Correlation: 
LDP Trigger = 0.75  AR, Rp  AR,  RP  AR, RP  AR,  Rp 
LDP Trigger = 1.0  AR,  Rp  AR,  RP  AR, RP  AR, RP 
Notes: Acronyms are defined as follows: LDP = loan deficiency payment, AR  = area-revenue insurance, IR = individual- 
revenue insurance, AY  = area-yield  insurance, and RP  = replacement pricing. Actuaridy fair and unfair refer to the pre- 
subsidy premium levels. 
Table 8. Risk Management Costs of Regressive Proportional Subsidy 
Actuarially Fair  Actuarially Unfair 
Restricted  Unrestricted  Restricted  Unrestricted 
Description  Area Coverage  Area Coverage  Area Coverage  Area Coverage 
Zero Price-Yield Correlation: 
LDP Trigger = 0.75  $3.95  $4.51  $0.65  $4.51 
LDP Trigger = 1.0  $4.02  $3.87  $0.36  $3.32 
Negative Price-Yield Correlation: 
LDP Trigger = 0.75  $6.18  $6.18  $1.53  $3.94 
LDP Trigger = 1.0  $5.94  $5.94  $1.11  $3.76 
Notes: LDP denotes loan deficiency payment. Actuaridy fair and unfair refer to the pre-subsidy premium levels. 
When facing the 1.3 pre-subsidy wedge and area insurance is restricted, the  farmer 
prefers area-revenue insurance with replacement pricing under both types of subsidy. 
Yet, because of impacts of the regressive proportional subsidy on acreage scaling and 
coverage levels, the farmer chooses a portfolio that is $0.36 to $1.53  per acre less effi- 
cient in terms of risk protection. When the area insurance restrictions are relaxed, the 
farmer  prefers either area-revenue insurance without replacement pricing or area-yield 
insurance  without replacement pricing under the  flat subsidy. Still, under the  regressive 
proportional subsidy, the farmer once again prefers the area-revenue insurance with 
replacement pricing in  order to capture  the  largest subsidy. The cost of less efficient risk 
protection ranges from $3.32  to $4.51 per acre (table 8). 
The farmer clearly prefers the current subsidy to the flat subsidy because of the signif- 
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causes the farmer to choose portfolios that are less efficient in the context of  managing 
risk. The results show the cost to farmers from choosing riskier portfolios is sometimes 
over twice the level of  the former flat subsidy, and farmers would be just as  well off under 
a flat subsidy which is up to 25% less than the current regressive proportional subsidy. 
Summary  and  Conclusions 
In this study, we examine the risk management ability of  different insurance contract 
designs and the impacts of  different subsidy rules on optimal contract choice and risk 
management. Numerical techniques are used to evaluate the behavior and well-being of 
an individual farmer using combinations of  revenue insurance, yield insurance, and pre- 
harvest pricing. The model is calibrated using parameters reflecting those faced by 
farmers in southwest Iowa in the mid-1990s. The robustness of  the results is evaluated 
by altering the base parameters and examining changes in the farmer's behavior. This 
analysis extends earlier work in this area by allowing the farmer to select optimal hedge 
ratios for both futures and insurance  contracts,  by evaluating alternative insurance design 
features such as  area-index  indemnification, and by exploring the effects of  an actuarially 
unfair pre-subsidy premium. However, the primary contribution is the evaluation of the 
impact of  different subsidy rules on optimal contract design and risk management. 
Without replacement pricing and under current restrictions, the findings indicate a 
combination of  futures and individual-yield insurance outperforms revenue insurance 
in managing risk. Further, when replacement pricing is used, portfolios of  individual- 
revenue insurance and futures are  better able to manage risk than yield insurance and 
futures. Area-index contracts  can provide better risk management  than individual-index 
contracts when "ad hocn  coverage restrictions are relaxed or the farmer faces actuarially 
unfair premiums for individual-index insurance. Replacement pricing is shown to 
improve the risk management ability of  individual insurance but may reduce the risk 
management effectiveness of  some area contracts. 
The new regressive proportional subsidy provides historically high subsidy levels 
which differ across contract designs. The current subsidy may alter the optimal choice, 
causing farmers to prefer contracts and hedge ratios that are not the most efficient, in a 
risk management sense, in order to capture additional  subsidy  income. Under the current 
subsidy, the representative farmer evaluated  in this study has strong incentives to choose 
area-revenue contracts with replacement pricing in order to capture the largest subsidy 
level. The farmer could be equally well off under a flat subsidy of  up to 25% less than the 
current regressive proportional subsidy because of  more efficient risk management. 
It is important to note these results are based on the behavior of  a representative 
farmer in southwest Iowa who faces a specific risk structure. We  have attempted to 
generalize some of the results by varying a number of  parameters in the analysis, such 
as  the level of correlation between prices and yields. However, many other assumptions 
are  made that may affect the study results, such as: (a)  the level of farmer risk aversion, 
(b)  production of a single crop, (c)  exogenous farm size, (d)  no capital markets for borrow- 
ing or lending, and (el decisions are made in a static framework. Relaxing these and 
other assumptions may affect the results, and so care must be taken when generalizing 
beyond the specific cases considered here. 
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